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I. INTRODUCTION
Maimonides’ arguments for creation ex nihilo are a centerpiece of The Guide
of the Perplexed and, like many other issues discussed in the Guide, the
question of whether the universe is created or eternal is still a matter of
controversy, as is Maimonides’ real opinion regarding it. Then, as now, the
Aristotelian theory of an eternal material universe seemed more plausible
to many people than did the Biblical view of creation ex nihilo. While
creation is the orthodox view in both Judaism and Christianity, the tension
between those two explanatory models goes back a long way.1 Referring to
the heretical views of Elisha ben Abuya, in the early Talmudic period, David
Hartman argues as follows.
He therefore found it impossible to remain within a tradition based
upon a false belief in creation. Maimonides attempts to prevent such
lapses as Elisha’s apostasy by offering the Guide as an epistemological
map which leads the student along a route that integrates the claims of
authority and reason.2
This is indeed an area where Maimonides felt that the claims of reason and
authority must be reconciled because he indicates that he would be willing
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some difficult passages in the Guide. His discussion of the Arabic text opened up for
me completely new ways of seeing things. Despite his help, however, any conclusions
(and errors) arrived at are my own.
1. Maimonides believed that prior to Abraham, the religion was Sabianism
(paganism), believing in an eternal universe and worshipping the stars (Guide III,
29).
2. D. Hartman, Maimonides: Torah and Philosophical Quest (Philadelphia: J.P.S.,
1976), p. 133.
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to accept Aristotle’s position on the eternity of the universe a parte ante3 if
it could be shown to be demonstrable.4 He also maintains, however, that
belief in creation is an essential “foundation of the Torah” and that accep-
tance of Aristotle’s notion of eternity “destroys the Law in its principle,
necessarily gives lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the hopes
and threats that the Law has held out.”5
Maimonides states clearly that no demonstrations for or against crea-
tion exist. He is severe in his criticism of the Kal˜am (Muslim theologians
who thought they had demonstrated the necessity of creation) and with the
philosophers who thought they had demonstrated the necessity of the
eternity of the universe.6 Yet he insists that creation can be defended on
rational grounds.
Maimonides invited criticism by insisting in his introduction to the
Guide that he would not contradict himself except with deliberation.7 Some
3. There are two kinds of eternity, a parte ante and a parte post. The former
refers to an eternal beginning (strange as it may seem), and the latter to an eternal
end. One can believe in creation ex nihilo but still not believe in a finite end.
Maimonides had no problem with that eternity.
4. It is usually assumed that he would have accepted a demonstrated version of
the eternity thesis. He states, “if the philosphers would succeed in demonstrating
eternity . . . the Law as a whole would become void, and a shift to other opinions would
take place.” (Guide II, 25, p. 330). This seems to be a normative statement, not a de-
scriptive one; in other places he states that the masses are not swayed by demonstra-
tive arguments but only by persuasive ones. Perhaps they would continue to believe in
the “Law” despite rational arguments against it. He also states, “Do not turn away
from the opinion according to which the world is new, except because of a demon-
stration” (Guide II, 24). He then lays down a methodology of scriptural interpretation
whereby one must reject the literal meaning of the text if contrary or contradictory
propositions can be demonstrated (Guide II, 25). He gives two “causes” (grounds?) for
not accepting the eternity view: the fact that it has not been demonstrated and the fact
that it “destroys the Law” (Guide II, 25). It is not clear whether they are sufficient con-
ditions for rejecting the doctrine or merely necessary conditions, whether he might
accept the eternity thesis though undemonstrated if it didn’t destroy the law or
whether he would accept it if demonstrated though it destroys the law.
5. See the Guide, Book II, Chap. 25, p. 328. Except where explicitly stated
otherwise, for this reference and all subsequent references to and quotations from
the Guide of the Perplexed, see the Shlomo Pines trans. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963).
6. See the Guide, Book I, Chap. 71, p. 180: “And everyone who engages in
speculation, who is perceptive, and who has acquired true knowledge of reality and
does not deceive himself, knows that with regard to this question (namely the
eternity of the world or its temporal creation) no cogent demonstration can be
reached and that it is a point before which the intellect stops.” He accuses the Kala˜m
of assuming the truth of the content of revelation in order to “demonstrate”
creation. He is particularly adamant about the mistaken attempt to ground a belief
in God on a belief in creation as he believes that the existence of God can be proven
even while conceding the eternity of the universe.
7. Maimonides discusses seven causes of contradictions or inconsistencies in
literary works but insists that in the Guide any inconsistencies should be attributed
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have concluded that his real position was not that which he openly ex-
pressed in the Guide; some have even argued that he really accepted the
eternity thesis. Their position stems from his desire to conceal esoteric
truths from the masses and the fact that he seems to contradict himself in
a few places in the Guide while discussing this issue. Others take Maimonides
at his word even if it leaves some contradictions.8
While I view Maimonides as having esoteric views and will explore them
somewhat, I will not attempt to find a completely secret position on creation
and eternity (if he had one). Nor will I answer hypothetical questions about
what his position would have been if he had indeed concluded that Aris-
totle’s eternity thesis was demonstrable or even true by preponderance of
evidence.9 While we can never really know the answers to those questions,
we perhaps can shed some light on the matter by a close examination of his
actual arguments.10
With all the scholarly interest in this subject, I have not seen Maimon-
ides’ argument for creation schematized, and it is also doubtful whether his
to the fifth or seventh cause. The fifth cause results from a necessary methodology
in explaining difficult concepts. The teacher must at times make different assump-
tions in order to induce the student to understand. This is very interesting because
we often come to understand by transcending inadequate conceptions which re-
main and are the cause of incongruities. The seventh cause is due to metaphysical
material that must be partly revealed but partly concealed so that only those capable
and worthy of understanding it will do so. It is that cause which has been focused
upon by many modern critical scholars.
8. Although unconvinced by the arguments for Maimonides’ supposed belief
in the eternity thesis, his position may not have been as diametrically opposed to it
as many have thought. Oftentimes what appear to be contrary doctrines can be
integrated into a higher synthesis. For a succinct argument for Maimonides’ accep-
tance of eternity, see Colette Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp. 188–92.
9. According to his stated views, he should have rejected creation if the
eternity thesis could be demonstrated. But people often have a way of reinterpret-
ing things when necessary in order to preserve fundamental beliefs even if this
changes the meaning of those assertions. Some say that Maimonides was only willing
to reinterpret scripture when the literal meaning of the text could be demonstrated
to be false. Arthur Hyman has made this assertion. See A. Hyman, “Maimonides on
Creation and Emanation” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John F. Wippel
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), p. 46. That can be
questioned, however. Maimonides states that the account of creation in the Bible is
not all to be taken literally without asserting that there are any demonstrable
problems with the text (Guide II, 29). More explicitly, he insists that Balaam’s talking
ass was a prophetic vision though the literal interpretation of the text does not seem
to be demonstrably false (Guide II, 42).
10. I deal mostly with his arguments in the Guide. Certain inconsistencies
between those arguments and some earlier writings have been noted. There is also
a great deal of medieval Jewish literature on the compatibility of rejection of
creation and acceptance of the Torah. See M. Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish
Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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argument has been given the intensive attention that it deserves.11 That is
unfortunate because many competent scholars continue to mischaracterize
the argument—possibly because it was camouflaged by so many superfluous
arguments.12 One may give many arguments for rhetorical purposes but if
one argument is pulling all of the weight, that is the real argument from a
logical perspective. In my view, the real argument was a simple one which
for the religiously  faithful would come close to a demonstration  as  he
promised. In a sense it is an integration of reason and authority as Hartman
has maintained. Alongside the argument there are appeals to authority or
pseudo-scientific arguments, more persuasive perhaps but not resembling
a demonstration. The arguments are often confused.
My position in brief is that Maimonides argues for creation ex nihilo on
the basis of the fact of revelation and not on any particular authoritative,
traditional opinion.13 Revelation is assumed and from that assumption
everything else follows. While this will be fleshed out in greater detail, I ask
the reader to reflect upon Maimonides’ asserted consequence of rejecting
creation  and accepting eternity (a result  that “destroys the  Law in its
principle, necessarily gives lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the
hopes and threats that the Law has held out” [my emphasis]).
II. MAIMONIDES, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
OF GOD AND CREATION
An attempt to understand what Maimonides means by creation requires a
knowledge of Maimonides’ view  of the Creator and  the limitations of
human knowledge regarding Him. While entire books have been written
about this, some pertinent aspects of his views will be noted here. Mai-
monides’ view of God has been termed “Neoplatonic.” He is reluctant to
place the Creator in any existing ontological category such as the Aristote-
lian form of the universe or to allow for much positive knowledge of God.14
11. See the Maimonidean bibliography of books and articles in major Euro-
pean languages from 1950–1986 by David R. Lachterman in Maimonidean Studies,
Vol. 1, ed. Arthur Hyman (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1990). In this
eighteen-page bibliography I found only eight publications which deal specifically
with creation, eternity of the universe, or both.
12. If I can show that 2 1 2 5 4 by logical demonstration, it is not necessary
to reinforce it by arguments from authority such as: “All mathematicians agree that
2 1 2 5 4.”
13. While no hard and fast rule applies, this is consistent with the tendency
among many medieval Sephardic scholars to rely upon tradition in areas of law and
upon reason in areas of belief.
14. From another point of view, Neoplatonism allows for greater knowledge of
God than does Aristotelianism. The Aristotelian metaphysics says little or nothing
about God except for placing the deity as the form and final cause of the universe
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This “negative theology” creates problems for his normative views regarding
humanity which include an intellectual approach to God who perhaps can
not really be known.15 While we will not deal with that problem in any
depth, it should be noted that Maimonides allows for knowledge of God in
terms of sheer existence and causal relationship to the world but certainly
not in terms of a divine “nature.”16 It could even be said that he is not as
restrictive in attributing relationships between God and the creation as he
sometimes explicitly states. For example, according to Maimonides the
existence of God is certain, can be demonstrated, and the world could not
exist without God’s continuing to exist.17 This means that the relationship
between God and the world is not purely extrinsic like the relationship be-
tween human beings and their creations but is intrinsically related to the
causal structure of objective reality.18 This makes God’s actions more inti-
while the Neoplatonic metaphysics allows for continuous connection (via emana-
tion) of all levels of reality. Hence, the Neoplatonist can climb to higher and higher
levels of reality. But the application of the Neoplatonic model to Judaism (as for
example in ibn Gabirol) stops that process somewhere below the Godhead. Mai-
monides seems to recognize that the Platonic view is much closer to the Biblical
concept of creation than is the Aristotelian one. The Aristotelian view allows one to
view God as the form of the universe, which is a concept accessible to human reason
and this expansive role for reason does not allow for skepticism. Shlomo Pines
asserted that the Maimonidean negative theology “was no intrinsic or important
part of the traditional Aristotelian system.” See his introduction to the Guide, p. xcv.
Maimonides does refer to God as the form of the universe and is insistent upon that
role and that of final cause (Guide I, 69) but cautions the reader that such language
cannot mean the same as its ordinary use (Guide, I, 69).
15. The problem is more religious than epistemological. The search for knowl-
edge rarely arrives at a final truth but how does one worship a deity about Whom
one knows nothing?
16. See the Guide II, 58.
17. See the Guide I, 69. For a good discussion see H. A. Wolfson, Repercussions
of the Kal˜am in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University, Press, 1979), pp.
188–89.
18. That is not to say that God’s being necessarily results in the causal structure
of the world as we know it but that the causal structure entails Divine activity or
being. This position seems to be opposed to the view of Seymour Feldman who
considers causality to be the sort of relational predicate which Maimonides prohib-
its from being applied to God. I believe that a careful reading of the Guide I, 52, 53
will show that by “relation,” Maimonides means something quite different and that
action predicates regarding God, which Maimonides allows, include what would
ordinarily be considered causality. To this end, he offers the following example:
“Zayd is the one who carpentered this door, built that particular wall, or wove this
garment.” He later states: “But you know that, regarding this subject, there is no
difference between your saying a cause and your saying a maker” (see the Guide I,
52, 69; pp. 119, 167). There is a great deal of truth in Feldman’s position if
“causality” is interpreted narrowly enough but we cannot adequately discuss causal-
ity here.  Feldman faults certain Christian Scholastics  for misinterpreting  Mai-
monides and states: “Nor did we find in Maimonides any examples of the schema
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mately connected to His Being than are the actions of human beings to the
human essence.19
Maimonides uses the Aristotelian concept of the relationship of form
to matter as a model for understanding the relationship between God
and the universe while cautioning that the true relationship is not really
the same.20 In the Guide II, 12, Maimonides even attempts to describe
his Neoplatonic emanationist view. The best interpretation that I have
found is that of Alexander Altmann: “For Maimonides the flow of ema-
nations that results in the bestowal of forms upon matter in the physical
world is identical with the flow of emanations that constitutes the exercise
of Providence and the gift of prophecy.”21 This is an esoteric view that,
according to Maimonides, is best described as an overflow as from an
overflowing spring.22 Although this is not the popular or naïve view of
creation, he apparently thought that it and the eternity thesis were mu-
tually exclusive. What emerges is a fairly detailed description of God’s
“God is Ø because He causes Ø in creatures.” See S. Feldman, “A Scholastic
Misinterpretation of Maimonides’ Doctrine of Divine Attributes,” Journal of Jewish
Studies 19 (1968): 23–29. Feldman is correct if one searches for the most literal
rendition of that formula in the Guide. But I did find something strongly resembling
that formula (Guide I, 54, p. 125): “It thus has become clear to you that the ways and
characteristics are identical. They are the actions proceeding from God, may he be
exalted, in reference to the world. Accordingly, whenever one of His actions is
apprehended, the attribute from which this action proceeds is predicated of Him,
may he be exalted, and the name deriving from that action is applied to Him. For
instance, one apprehends the kindness of His governance in the production of the
embryos of living beings, the bringing of various faculties to existence in them and
in those who rear them after birth faculties that preserve them from destruction
and annihilation and protect them from harm and are useful to them in all the
doings that are necessary to them. Now actions of this kind proceed from us only
after we feel a certain affection and compassion, and this is the meaning of mercy.
God, may he be exalted, is said to be merciful, just as it is said, Like as a father is merciful
to  his children, . . . It is not that God, may he be exalted, is affected and has
compassion. But an action similar to that which proceeds from a father in respect
to his child and that is attached to compassion, pity, and an absolute passion,
proceeds from Him.” Maimonides refers here to the production by God of
caregivers as a justification for attributing the attribute of mercy to Him. Hence, He
is merciful because He causes mercy in creatures.
19. Whatever  God does is a completely free and knowledgeable decision
whereas human beings are the victims of ignorance and powerlessness. But only
created things have essences.
20. Guide I, 69, p. 169. Maimonides, perhaps incorrectly, interprets Aristotle’s
God of the Metaphysics to be imbedded in matter. That might have been Aristotle’s
prior opinion in earlier writings such as On Philosophy. For a good discussion see the
“Aristotle” article by G. B. Kerferd in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vols. (New York:
Macmillan Publishing, 1967), 1:160–61.
21. A. Altmann, “Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas: Natural or Divine Pro-
phecy?” in Essays in Jewish Intellectual History (Hanover, N. H. Brandeis University
Press, 1981), p. 82.
22. Compare with Shelomo ibn Gabirol’s Mekor Hayim (Spring of Life).
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relationship to the material universe combined with an utter ignorance
of His essential being.23
The  limitations on essential knowledge of God play a role in the
argument for creation and the kind of creation that he is arguing for. On
the one hand, he claims to argue for a Biblical view of creation but his view
of the Creator and the limitations that he sets on such knowledge makes it
impossible for him to fully support the Biblical account. For Maimonides,
divine “actions” seem to be emanations no matter how much he insists upon
creation as a free act of God. Hence, his view is essentially neither creation
nor eternity even if he ultimately comes down in favor of the former. There
is tension here between three aims: support of the Biblical account, a
Neoplatonized Aristotelian view of the relationship between form and mat-
ter and between God and the universe, and a pious Neoplatonic ignorance
regarding God. The result seems to be esotericism hidden behind tradi-
tional views.
III. ETERNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF
ARISTOTLE AND MAIMONIDES
In the Aristotelian view, time is dependent upon the motion of physical
objects. For Aristotle, eternity of the universe means time without begin-
ning or end, a view not acceptable to Maimonides. Nor was the literal
meaning of the Biblical account of creation acceptable. The Bible speaks
about time prior to the formation of the heavenly bodies but time is linked
to the movement of the earth vis-à-vis the sun. The Bible depicts God
performing acts of creation on days one, two, and so forth, but God is
beyond time and one cannot qualify God’s acts in terms of time which is a
created accident.24 He argues, therefore, for knowledge of God based solely
on His acts, which are known in a temporal dimension but essentially have
nothing to do with time because they are emanations. We may recognize a
similarity with certain views of Aristotle. Maimonides attributes to Aristotle
the belief that the second intellect proceeds from the first and the first from
23. For a very good discussion of the subject of negative theology in Mai-
monides and Aquinas, see Isaac Franck, “Maimonides and Aquinas on Man’s Knowl-
edge of God: A Twentieth Century Perspective,” in Maimonides: A Collection of Essays,
ed. Joseph A. Buijs (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp.
284–305. Although the article is biased in favor of negative theology and glosses
over ethical and other normative problems, it includes some good analysis.
24. “The purpose however is that, according to us, time is a created and
generated thing, as are the other accidents and the substances serving as substrata
to these accidents. Hence God’s bringing the world into existence does not have a
temporal beginning, for time is one of the created things. Consider this matter
thoroughly” (Guide II, 15, p. 282).
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God, insisting that Aristotle did not mean there was temporal succession or
efficient causality but some other kind of necessary causality.25 Aristotle’s
eternal universe may not be what it appears at first blush and neither
perhaps is Maimonides’ creation.26
IV. MISTAKEN VIEWS REGARDING THE ARGUMENT
One purpose of this article is to show that Maimonides’ views are often
misunderstood. In the Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, one finds this opinion
in the article entitled “Creation”:
Maimonides does not attempt to demonstrate the truth of the idea of
creation on any logical ground. He states that it cannot be proved, and
that it is a matter of belief. Nor is it an essential belief of Judaism or
definitely taught in the Bible; he says that if he were to accept the
theory of the eternity of matter, he could explain away the Biblical word
bara, “create” as meaning “to shape” matter that had already existed.27
The author was perhaps mistaken is supposing that creation is not “an
essential belief of Judaism” and not “definitely taught in the Bible.” He was
surely mistaken in denying to the doctrine “any logical ground.” We will
attempt to ascertain how such errors arise.
In the Encyclopedia Judaica article on creation some statements also raise
questions.
Maimonides does not find the   proofs   of   the Kala˜m   convinc-
ing. . . . Moreover, he rejects the Neoplatonic accounts of creation. On
the other hand, he argues that neither Aristotle nor his Muslim follow-
ers have succeeded in demonstrating the eternity of the universe.
Hence, the issue cannot be decided on philosophical grounds alone.
For Maimonides, however, it must be decided, since to adopt the
eternity hypothesis is tantamount to the claim that the universe and its
laws necessarily emanate from God. The belief in miracles implies,
however, that God can freely interrupt the course of nature. Thus the
25. See the Guide II, 21, p. 316.
26. In the Guide II, 2, Maimonides states that the “strongest proofs” for crea-
tion involve the existence of the separate intellects, which he identifies with the
Biblical angels. He does not explain this further. One suspects he is alluding to the
esoteric emanationist doctrine previously alluded to which can never be explicitly
stated and can be grasped only after years of study and contemplation. Perhaps the
conceptual gap between creation and eternity can be bridged by a theory of
emanation involving separate intellects, but for Maimonides, the universe (and
time) did not always exist; their existence is to be explained by a free (not neces-
sary) act of God.
27. The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia, 10 vols. (New York: The Universal Jewish
Encyclopedia, Inc., 1941), 3:396.
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question of creation is especially perplexing: it must be decided, but
philosophy cannot resolve it. . . . At this point Maimonides appeals to
revelation.28
In that excellent article, Seymour Feldman seems to equate “philosophi-
cal grounds” with demonstrative arguments but few philosophical disputes
have been amenable to such foolproof arguments. There are non-demon-
strative (dialectical) methods in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle, dia-
lectics is a discipline intermediate between demonstrative science and
rhetoric; it is not certain knowledge nor is it mere persuasive opinion. If
philosophical arguments ought to be demonstrations, Aristotle’s rambling
discussions in the Metaphysics and other works would make no sense and
much philosophy would be nonsense. It is true that for Aristotle the most per-
fect scientific knowledge is demonstrative, but he also uses the term “knowl-
edge” for lower degrees of clarity and certainty.29 Dialectical arguments,
historically, were sometimes approved of and sometimes not; they never con-
stituted an ideal. But Aristotle states in the Topics that dialectics is useful “be-
cause the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will
make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that
arise,” and has further use as a “process of criticism wherein lies the path to
the principles of all inquiries”30 Hence, despite the superiority of demonstra-
tive arguments, the less certain process of dialectics is essential to truth seek-
ing. Maimonides, as we will see, thought that much of Aristotle’s science was
not demonstrative. He also recognized that Aristotle’s argument for eternity
was not demonstrative yet praised it as superior to other views in contention.
Maimonides, therefore, was not of the opinion that the only good philo-
sophical ground for accepting a proposition is a demonstrative proof though
he considered it the best philosophical ground.31 H. A. Wolfson thought that
Maimonides’ argument for creation was not demonstrative nor based on
revelation but based on some other kind of reasoning.32
28. Encyclopedia Judaica, 5:1067–68.
29. See Aristotle, Physics, I, 1.
30. Aristotle, Topics I, 2.
31. There is some evidence that Maimonides looked down upon dialectical
arguments (as at Guide II, 16), but a careful reading of that passage allows for
dialectical arguments when a proposition that cannot be demonstrated is accepted
as an axiom. Averroes may have equated demonstrative arguments with philosophi-
cal arguments and relegated dialectical arguments to religion in Kitab Fasl alMaqal.
It has been asserted by Daniel Lasker that most late Medieval Jewish philosophers
accepted this Averroistic theory. See D. Lasker, “Averroistic Trends in Jewish-Chris-
tian Polemics in the Late Middle Ages,” Speculum, 55 (1980): 294–304.
32. “Maimonides, however, tries to show the untenability of the Aristotelian
theory of the eternity of the world, or at least its inferiority to the theory of creation,
on purely rational grounds. He does not assume a priori that it is contradictory to
Scripture” (H. A. Wolfson, “The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Crea-
tion in Hallevi and Maimonides,” in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 2
vols. [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973], 21:245).
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Second, it is not entirely clear why “it must be decided” (creation versus
eternity). Feldman explains, quite correctly, that miracles imply the ability
of God to “interrupt the course of nature.” Such an interruption would
seem to be inconsistent with eternal necessity. But whether one accepts a
certain fact to be a miracle might depend upon one’s theory of creation or
eternity. As Maimonides sometimes downplays the importance of miracles,
why are they so important in this context?
Third, it is true that statements of Maimonides taken out of context
imply an appeal to revelation or authority as a source of belief in creation
but this must be reconciled with his promise to provide a proof that is close
to being a demonstration. He does not oppose a person accepting creation
on the basis of revelation; he even recommends it in the Guide. But an
appeal to authority cannot be profitably mixed with a quasi-demonstrative
argument.33 They must be treated as parallel yet separate justifications, each
useful for different types of people but logically the latter takes precedence
over the former.
Many other commentators misunderstood Maimonides’ arguments.
Shimon ben Zema Duran, for example, seemed to confuse it with some-
thing else. He assumed that Judaism is an axiomatic system like Euclidean
geometry and creation a premise from which other beliefs (such as revela-
tion) follow.34 This is in keeping with a medieval tendency to seek certain
bases for beliefs but not with Maimonides’ thinking. Falsifying premises
does not refute conclusions inferred from them.35
33. This analysis supports an esoteric doctrine and/or the position that there
is a double truth. In a recent conversation, Daniel Lasker suggested that one can
speak of a double truth position only if a Jewish philosopher were to argue that he
holds one belief rather than another only because he is Jewish. I use the term
“double truth” in a broader sense. What I am suggesting is that for Maimonides, the
truth for the masses is whatever authoritative tradition dictates about creation,
unless it contradicts reason. But for the Jewish philosopher, quasi-demonstrative
argument leads to a somewhat different view of creation.
34. See his Oheb Mishpat, Intro. “It is also known that God’s providence neces-
sarily follows from belief in creation,” and “It is one of the principles of the Torah
to believe in this providence which the Book of Job seeks to verify. Maimonides
included it among the great principles, such as belief in God’s existence and beliefs
similar to it, which are such that there is no hope for him who denies them” (chap.
viii). But how does Divine Providence follow logically from creation? The universe
could have been created by a malevolent Gnostic spirit.
35. In an excellent analysis of Duran and Maimonides, Menachem Kellner
attributes to Duran the belief that resurrection of the dead is logically dependent
upon creation and that is why Maimonides did not include the latter as one of the
dogmas of Judaism. He then criticizes Duran for not recognizing that if such is the
case creation should be the dogma and not resurrection of the dead. Without
attempting to interpret what Duran really meant, it seems to me that Kellner is
mistaken because believing in creation does not logically obligate one to believe in
resurrection. If resurrection is “logically dependent” on creation it must be in a
different sense altogether. Perhaps a belief in resurrection (and miracles in gen-
eral) logically entails a belief in creation (or at least a denial of eternal necessity)
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A. Revelation or Reason?
As we have seen, some interpret Maimonides’ argument for creation to be
based on revelation and others say that it is based on reason. How can one
be confused about such a fundamental distinction? The reason seems to be
that at times Maimonides stresses one and at times the other.
Now inasmuch as this is true in my opinion and inasmuch as this
question (I mean to say that of the eternity of the world or its creation
in time) becomes an open question, it should in my opinion be ac-
cepted without proof because of prophecy, which explains things to
which it is not in the power of speculation to accede. For as we shall
make clear, prophecy is not set at naught even in the opinion of those
who believe in the eternity of the world.
After I have made it clear that what we maintain is possible, I shall
begin to make it prevail likewise, by means of speculative proof, over
any other affirmations; I refer to my making prevail the assertion of
creation in time over the assertion of eternity. I shall make it clear that
just as a certain disgrace attaches to us because of the belief in the
creation in time, an even greater disgrace attaches to the belief in
eternity.36
Maimonides creates confusion by saying that in the absence of demonstra-
tive proof one ought to follow prophecy and that it will also be possible to
employ rational arguments for creation. Whether one simply follows the
authority of prophecy or whether one looks more deeply, however, reason
is on the side of creation according to Maimonides. What kind of reason
does he refer to?
B. Does Maimonides Employ “Probabilistic” Argumentation?
Marvin Fox termed Aristotle’s favoring of the eternity explanation “prob-
abilistic.” While it is not exactly clear where Fox found that term, it was
used by  Wolfson as  well.37 Unlike Wolfson,  however, Fox asserted that
and the affirmation of eternal necessity would then obligate one logically to deny
miracles. This is my opinion and also that of Seymour Feldman. See his article on
creation in Encyclopedia Judaica. If that is the case, then Maimonides’ omission of
creation from his list of dogmas makes perfect sense. See M. Kellner, Dogma in
Medieval Jewish Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 58.
36. Guide II, 16, p. 294.
37. Although Fox does not give citations for his use of the term “probabilistic,”
the following Arabic phrase in the Guide, II, 15, describing Aristotle’s rationale for
believing in the eternity thesis is cited by Wolfson as evidence of a “probabilistic”
proof: al-dala ‘il . . . allati tabdu wa-tamilu al-nafsu ilaiha akthara. See H. A. Wolfson,
“The Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Mai-
monides,” in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 1:244. Pines translated it
as: “the proofs . . . such as occur to the mind and to which the soul inclines.”
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Maimonides, unlike Aristotle, could not accept such an argument at all.38
He then proceeded to a rather lengthy discussion of probabilistic reason-
ing.39 But those discussions are rather misleading since probability in the
modern sense did not emerge until the seventeenth century, and Aristotle
was surely not employing it, nor was Maimonides.40 Fox seemed to rec-
ognize this difficulty and attempted to rescue his opinion by arguing that
all probabilistic reasoning, modern, ancient, or medieval, are arguments
from analogy.41 But that reasoning does not seem valid in this context
for two reasons. Probability (of the modern kind) applies to events and
not beliefs and the event of interest (beginning of the universe) is utterly
unique.42
Professor Toledano pointed out that the Pines translation omits the important word
akthara (more) which Kafih translated as yoter in Hebrew. Toledano translates it as:
“that are apparent and to which the soul (mind) shows greater inclination (inclines
more) or is more favorably disposed.” This seems to refer to a comparison between
two or more theories or explanations, a connotation which is overlooked in both
the Pines translation and the Friedlander translation which reads: “proofs . . . only
apparent and plausible.” It should be obvious, however, that these “proofs” have
little to do with probability as we use that term today.
38. According to Wolfson, Maimonides disagrees with Aristotle’s conclusion
and according to Fox he finds the entire method invalid because you cannot
deduce origins from current state of affairs.
39. See M. Fox, Interpreting Maimonides (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990), pp. 278–83.
40. “The old medieval probability was a matter of opinion. An opinion was
probable if it was approved by ancient authority, or at least was well testified to. This
medieval concept of probability is related to our own, but in a surprising way. A new
kind of testimony was accepted: the testimony of nature which, like any authority,
was to be read.” See Ian Hacking, The Emergency of Probability (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1975), p. 43–44.
41. The discussion of analogical reasoning is interesting and reflects the literal
meaning of the Arabic text. In the Guide II, 24 the term qi’ yas is employed. It means
“syllogism,” “reasoning,” or “analog” (like the Hebrew word “heykesh”), and its
most literal meaning according to Professor Toledano is “measuring by fitting one
thing against another.” But Friedlander mistakenly translated is negation as “im-
probable and objectionable” (p. 197). The better Pines translation reads “incongru-
ous and dubious.” A similar mistranslation is found in II, 23 where Friedlander
reads “degree of improbability and deviation from real facts” (p. 195), while the
Pines translation reads “how great is their incongruity and what is their disagree-
ment with what exists” (p. 321). What this shows is the very real difference between
medieval probability, which meant congruity with how things should be (as in the
expression “an improbable marriage”), and modern probability which is linked
with numerical frequency distributions.
42. The subjectivistic interpreters of probability might disagree with this state-
ment. For a thorough if somewhat biased account of the efficacy of applying
probability to hypotheses, see Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York:
Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 254–65.
232 ANDREW L. GLUCK
Other scholars have also asserted that Maimonides used probabilistic
reasoning in his defense of creation.43 Furthermore, the term “improbable”
does appear in the Friedlander translation in regard to what Maimonides
considers invalid proofs for eternity.44 Most disturbing to this view, however,
is the emerging understanding that medieval “probability” was mostly an
appeal to authority.45 Lenn E. Goodman in his excellent “Maimonides”
article in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy states:
Neither biblical creationism or Aristotelian eternalism is demonstrable,
it argues. But creation is more probable, and preferable theologically,
since it can explain the difference God’s act makes in the world and
can rely on God’s freedom to explain how multiplicity emerges from
sheer divine simplicity.46
Goodman’s is on target but “probable” is an unfortunate term.
C. Maimonides’ Arguments and the Kala˜m
The Kal˜am (Mutakallimun) were Muslim religious thinkers who used quasi-
philosophical arguments to bolster their beliefs. It is generally thought that
Maimonides was more intellectually honest, and he criticized the Kala˜m
severely in the Guide.47 But his relationship to the Kala˜m is not as simple as
it appears. Leo Strauss said that the Guide is not a philosophical work at all
but a work along the lines of the Kala˜m.48 Seymour Feldman contended
that Maimonides accepted the fifth and sixth arguments for creation from
43. Even a great scholar like Wolfson casually remarked that Maimonides
employed arguments from probability to prove creation without discussing exactly
what kind of probability he might have been using. See H. A. Wolfson, “The
Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides”
in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, 1:236, 244. Wolfson provides the
reader with the citations in both the original Arabic as well as the Hebrew transla-
tion (see n. 32). He also attempts to connect this medieval probability with Aris-
totle’s concept of probability discussed in Prior Analytics II, 27 (70a3–4). But
Aristotle was discussing connections which are usually the case (such as “the envious
hate”) whereas creation (or eternity) is either always true or never true.
44. Guide II, 23, 24, (pp. 195, 196).
45. This has been well argued by Ian Hacking in The Emergence of Probability.
46. See The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1995).
47. Since the Kala˜m thought that they had demonstrated creation, and Mai-
monides rejected that assertion, it is often erroneously thought that he simply
accepted it on faith.
48. L. Strauss, “The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed,” Essays on
Maimonides, An Octocentennial Volume, ed. S. W. Baron (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity press, 1941), pp. 37–91.
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the Kala˜m.49 The sixth argument is a modified version of the fifth, which
can be summarized as follows:
Anything imaginable is possible.
Since anything can be different than it is, we need to explain why
it is as it is.
Such an explanation involves a principle of particularization which
implies a creator.
Therefore, there is a creator and creation.
An examination of this argument will reveal that everything except the
purported need to explain why things are as they are is implicit in the first
premise, which is the tenth of the twelve propositions of the Kal˜am. It
should be obvious,  however,  that such a premise is incompatible  with
“explanation” in any conventional sense because something that explains
everything conceivable really explains nothing whatsoever, and the belief
that anything imaginable is possible relieves one of the need to explain
anything. Therefore, the first and second premises seem inconsistent. But
Maimonides explicitly rejects that tenth proposition in his discussion of the
Kal˜am.50 It seems odd that he would use an argument based on a false
premise (the tenth proposition) even if he were to accept the conclusion
regarding creation. Maimonides also attacks this argument for being com-
patible with the theory of the eternity of the universe as well.51 Despite this,
he does in fact call it the “best” argument of the Kal˜am and employs a
modified version of it in Book II, Chapter 1. As it turns out, however,
Maimonides can use this argument only by basing it upon a different
premise altogether. That premise is that while most events in the universe
(at least in the sub-lunar realm) are necessary and determined, some are
49. See S. Feldman, “Abravanel on Maimonides’ Critique of the Kal˜am,” in
Maimonidean Studies, ed. Arthur Hyman, vols. (New York: Yeshiva University Press,
1990), 1:9–10.
50. See Guide I, 73.
51. He states in the Guide I, 72 that this theory had been adopted by some
philosophers who believed in the eternity thesis. It is not difficult to see why because
it is really compatible with any explanation whatsoever except one based on laws of
causation. A law is always something that can be comprehended in contrast with
some more mysterious causal principle. If there is no principle of determinism in
the universe itself (operating within time and space), then things must be deter-
mined by some eternal non-nomological principle or they must be completely
chaotic. The Mutakallimun had argued that the will of God was just such a mysteri-
ous principle of determination. Since that “explanation” is unacceptable to most
philosophers, they opt for the eternity thesis. But, as Maimonides states, almost all
of the “Andalucians” (Jewish philosophers of Spain) attempted to combine a belief
in a creating God with immanent causal principles.
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not and that anomalous fact of apparent indeterminacy is incompatible with
any explanation other than that of a creator and creation.
V. LOGICAL ARGUMENTS AND FALSIFICATION
All rational arguments require premises. An appeal to authority is prem-
ised by the belief that an authority is trustworthy and also by some pro-
nouncement of that authority. A dialectical argument in the Aristotelian
tradition is premised by at least one statement that is generally agreed
upon and perhaps also  by some  self-evident  premise. A demonstrative
argument in the Aristotelian tradition is one in which all of the premises
are self-evident. What qualifies all of these arguments as deductive is the
condition that if the premises are all true, the conclusion must be true
as well. But if the premises are false the conclusion may still be true.
One can have a perfectly valid argument characterized by false premises
and a true conclusion. Disproving a premise (by itself) never disproves
the conclusion except where one of the premises may be completely
contained within the conclusion, and disproving that premise logically
obliges one to reject the conclusion. For example, consider the following
argument.
All bachelors in this town are poor.
Jones is a bachelor in this town.
Therefore, Jones is a poor bachelor in this town.
If we reject the minor premise, we must reject the conclusion for reasons
that were just mentioned. But rejecting the major premise does not oblige
us to reject the conclusion. If we changed the conclusion to: “Jones is poor,”
rejecting either the minor or major premise (or both) no longer obliges us
to reject the conclusion. It is true that in certain kinds of legal reasoning
the correct premises are needed in order to make the case. If the evidence
was obtained illegally or if the evidence is simply not accepted according to
the legally binding burden of proof, the accused person goes free but that
does not mean that he or she is not really guilty. This brings us to our main
point. In general the only logical way to disprove or falsify a statement is to disprove
its logical consequence.52
52. The technical term for a logically valid argument of this kind is “denying
the consequent.”
If p, then q
not q
therefore, not p
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However, it is commonly thought  that  one  can  refute or attack a
conclusion by subjecting one or more of its premises to doubt. We often
hear people say “your conclusions are only as good as your premises.” That
statement is generally false, but it does point to a very interesting historical
fact. The medieval ideal of scientific knowledge was a conclusion that could
be demonstratively derived from more or less certain premises. Given that
ideal of knowledge (which is no longer our ideal), conclusions are only as
good as the premises (assuming that the reasoning is valid). If a conclusion
failed to follow logically from certain premises, it would be placed in the
category of authoritative (probable) opinion and not in the category of
knowledge. A rational argument from authority asserts that since such and
such authority asserts P one should not believe Not P unless it can be
logically demonstrated.53
All beliefs have logical implications and all those logical implications
(once  they are understood as such) constitute necessary conditions of
that belief. This is not always recognized because quite often we mix up
those beliefs that are necessary for a certain position and those that are
not. For example, in an extremely erudite and well thought out article
Arthur Hyman characterizes Maimonides’ beliefs regarding creation as
follows:
(1) God brought the world into existence after absolute non-exist-
ence;
(2) He brought everything into existence through His will and
volition (although, as has already been noticed, His wisdom was
operative as well);
(3) He brought everything into existence out of nothing; and
(4) Time is created, so that whatever one’s theory, creation must be
considered as atemporal.54
Hyman then discusses Maimonides’ opinion that the Platonic view of crea-
tion out of pre-existing matter does not “undermine the foundations of the
Law” and suggests that the Platonic view leaves at least one of those four
The mode of inference is modus tollens and can be contrasted with the fallacious
argument called “denying the antecedent.”
If p, then q
not p
therefore, not q
53. Some medieval rationalists might have allowed disagreement with author-
ity on the grounds of near certainty or moral certainty.
54. Arthur Hyman, “Maimonides on Creation and Emanation,” Studies in Medie-
val Philosophy, ed. J. F. Wippel (Vol. 17 of Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philoso-
phy) (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), p. 49.
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beliefs intact, namely, (2).  This makes perfect sense because of those
four beliefs only (2) is a necessary condition for believing in creation. In
other words, if (2) turns out to be false (unlike [1], [3], and [4]), creation
has been falsified.55 Creation by divine will (that is, [2]) is a necessary
condition and logical implication of revelation.
What does this tell us about the creation argument? Let us ignore for
the moment how we originally arrived at the belief in revelation. Once we
believe in it we are obliged to believe in creation because a universe built
on either chance or necessity (the alternatives) makes revelation an impos-
sibility.
VI. THE BASIC LOGICAL FORM OF THE ARGUMENT
Maimonides clearly states that neither eternity nor creation can be strictly
demonstrated on the basis of certain premises. But he also states that he
can argue for creation in a manner that comes close to being a demon-
stration.56 I interpret this to mean that the argument has the same logical
form as a demonstrative argument but that the premises (while not alto-
gether certain) are more certain than any authoritative assertion.57 This
is quite different from an argument from authority pure and simple. For
example, an argument from authority pure and simple would be to cite
an opinion of Aristotle or a verse from the Bible, accept it axiomatically
and then draw inferences from that. Taking Maimonides at his word that
he will give a proof of creation that comes close to being a demonstration
and is not simply an argument from authority and given what we have just
said about falsification, I will argue that the basic logical form of Mai-
55. (1) is not a necessary condition for creation because “before” and “after”
might have no real meaning except in a created universe. (3) is not a necessary condi-
tion because even Maimonides admitted the possibility and compatibility with revela-
tion of creation out of pre-existing matter. (4) seems to conflict with (1), but even if
they can be reconciled, the nature of time seems to be a philosophial issue essentially
unrelated to creation. Those who believe in creation but do not share the Aristote-
lian/Maimonidean theory of time may be mistaken but are not inconsistent.
56. Guide II, 19, p. 303.
57. Otherwise, such an argument would simply be an argument from author-
ity. An example might be our faith in the medical profession. We trust doctors as
authoritative sources of useful information even while knowing that many of their
particular opinions are bound to be false. Our trust in medicine in general is based
on a kind of reasoning very different from our acceptance of particular medical
advice, which we usually take on faith or authority. The belief in an infallible
transmission of a revelation makes any such analogy imperfect but one still needs
to know when to interpret the revelation literally or allegorically.
MAIMONIDES’ ARGUMENTS FOR CREATION 237
monides’ argument against the eternity of the universe and for creation
is as follows:
If P, then Q
P
Therefore, Q
where “P” is the fact of revelation and “Q” is creation (or the rejection of
eternity).
How does one arrive at the premise: If P then Q? Remember that an
eternal universe implies that nothing essentially different (such as revela-
tion) ever occurs. This could be schematized as:
If not Q, then not P
P (not not P)
Therefore, Q
or more specifically:
If eternity, then no revelation
But there is revelation
Therefore, no eternity
These are dialectical arguments and, like all such arguments, presuppose a
community that agrees on a premise that is not exactly self-evident (revela-
tion). The obvious problem with this argument has nothing to do with its
logical form and its premises were generally accepted in the middle ages.
Therefore, it comes close to being a demonstration. We might inquire as to
whether “If revelation, then creation” is really true. In his own arguments
against Aristotle’s eternity of the world thesis, Maimonides said that we
cannot draw conclusions about the origins of the universe from its present
state. While eternity of the universe seems to be inconsistent with revelation
(in the current state of things), how do we know that an eternal universe
could not have evolved to a point where revelation is possible?58 This may
require revising the argument.
58. Is eternity consistent with a universe that evolves under the tutelage of God?
Though eternity implies no essential change, unusual events could occur occasion-
ally but recurrently (perhaps every 10,000 years). From our perspective such events
would appear unique. According to Joseph A Buijs, Maimonides states that eternity is
not really inconsistent with “divine purpose and will” and cites the Guide II, 19, 22 as
proof. I am unable to find that assertion. What Maimonides does say at the end of II,
19 is that some commentators have made that assertion. In practically all other matters
I agree with Buijs who states: “What is actually at issue in this dispute is which view is
compatible with a belief in divine purpose and will.” See J. A. Buijs, “The Philosophi-
cal Character of Maimonides’ Guide,” in Maimonides: A Collection of Essays, ed. J.A. Buijs
(Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 62.
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VII. THE RATIONAL STATUS OF BELIEFS
There are many beliefs that we hold that cannot be rationally justified.
Some of those beliefs are held quite fervently. Religious and political beliefs
and beliefs about loved ones are obvious examples; some would also say that
many, and perhaps all, scientific hypotheses cannot really be rationally
justified either. Yet there is a major difference between a person who holds
rationally unjustified beliefs that he/she would never abandon under any
circumstances and one who would be willing to abandon his/her beliefs if
reason so demands. While such a compromise between rationally unjusti-
fied beliefs and reason may be a good description of our normal state of
affairs, it is not clear whether it can be normatively justified if reason is our
only norm. But it would be difficult to find the human being for whom
reason is the only norm and some even argue that reason provides no ends
at all but only means. This, however, was not the position of either Mai-
monides or the many medieval rationalists who believed that reason pro-
vided ends and means.
In an article filled with extremely  interesting suggestions,  Charles
Manekin asserts that Maimonides in the Guide shows little interest in
knowledge (rationally justified belief) but much interest in belief in gen-
eral.59 Perhaps that was somewhat of an overstatement, but it certainly
was the case regarding creation/eternity and to a certain extent regarding




Maimonides alludes to the fact that some scientific theories (Aristotelian
physics, for example) are rationally demonstrable and others (astronomy)
are not.60 In this, he seems to have departed from a strict Aristotelian view
of science.
Aristotle states that science (knowledge) is “understanding a thing by
means of its causes.”61 By cause, however, Aristotle means efficient, material,
formal, and final causes, but only the first of those is recognized as a cause
59. C. H. Manekin, “Belief, Certainty and Divine Attributes in the Guide,” in
Maimonidean Studies I:117–41.
60. He refers to scientific theories of Aristotle as “guesses” or “conjectures”
(see Guide II, 22). But his extreme confidence in Aristotelian physics brands that
system as certain knowledge.
61. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1013–1014a.
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by modern science. Knowledge, according to Aristotle, is acquired by dem-
onstration with the exception of knowledge of primary premises, which is
independent of demonstration.62 According to Aristotle, beliefs about par-
ticulars or accidents is not science or knowledge at all but opinion.63 For
Aristotle science is the study of the unchanging essences of things and such
knowledge is to be acquired through demonstrative arguments and primary
premises (self-evidently true by a faculty of intuition).64
Modern science, on the other hand, deals with particulars even though
it strives for theoretical simplicity and comprehensibility. This has pre-
sented a problem for modern philosophy of science, which on the one
hand has rejected Aristotelian essences but on the other hand has not
wanted to admit that all theoretical knowledge is merely statistical or prob-
abilistic as is the prediction of particular events. Philosophers of science
might either argue that scientific theories are justified by inductive reason-
ing or are simply our best current conjectures which have so far eluded
falsification. Considering the nature of medieval science, I would suspect
that for Maimonides any scientific theory that was not demonstrable would
be conjectural and this, in fact, is what he says:
Everything that Aristotle has said about all that exists from beneath the
sphere of the moon to the center of the earth is indubitably correct,
and no one will deviate from it unless he does not understand it or
unless he has preconceived opinions that he wishes to defend or that
lead him to a denial of a thing that is manifest. On the other hand,
everything that Aristotle expounds with regard to the sphere of the
moon and that which is above it is, except for certain things, something
analogous to guessing and conjecturing. All the more does this apply
to what he says about the order of the intellects and to some of the
opinions regarding the divine that he believes; for the latter contain
grave incongruities and perversities that manifestly and clearly appear
as such to all the nations, that propagate evil, and that he cannot
demonstrate.65
Given the Aristotelian ideal of demonstrative knowledge that was operating
in an age of faith, any mere conjecture (scientific or philosophical) was no
match for a strongly held religious belief. That is why Maimonides’ main
task is to convince his reader that Aristotle not only did not demonstrate
the eternity of the universe, but that he did not even think he had. It is easy
to misunderstand Maimonides as a proto-empiricist—and perhaps for good
62. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 72b18–20.
63. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 74b; Metaphysics 1026b1–5.
64. For Aristotle, intuition is connected to the process of induction, by which
he means that the same or similar essence is intuited in a variety of objects or events.
For example, by encountering a multitude of humans we induce that all have
rational souls.
65. Guide II, 22, pp. 319–20.
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reason.66 If there are  elements in his thought that seem modern and
empirical, we should still not forget that for him the two major justifications
for belief were reason and revelation. Whenever the literal meaning of a
sacred text  can be  demonstrated to be  false it must be  reinterpreted.
Scientific truth as the result of the empirical investigation of nature would
rank far beneath reason and revelation and was still in its infancy, so we can
eliminate empirical criteria as the mode of decision making for Mai-
monides in the creation/eternity dispute. Did he accept creation solely on
the basis of prophecy? His insistence on rational arguments indicates that
belief in creation is so fundamental that it cannot be based on revelation
alone.
IX. ARGUMENTS FOR CREATION IN THE GUIDE
I have shown the effective bare bones logical argument that Maimonides
might have employed if his argument were to come close to being a dem-
onstration. As we will see, it requires supplementation with other premises
if we are to look upon it at all favorably; however, the basic form of the
argument will remain the same. We cannot infer that this is his argument
by carefully reading the text. But the arguments that he does explicitly cite
are not convincing. So either he believes in unconvincing arguments, does
not really believe that there are arguments for creation, or believes that we
must look for another argument. I opt for the third option. Interestingly,
despite its rather obvious nature, many commentators have mistaken it for
very different kinds of arguments. The reason for that is not hard to
discern. Maimonides employs many logically ineffective arguments in the
Guide which can only be understood as rhetorical. I will briefly review those
ineffective arguments and show that they have no logical power. We can
assume that Maimonides was also aware of this.
Book II, Chapter 13
Here Maimonides notes that there are three opinions regarding creation
among those who believe in a deity. The first is the opinion of the Law of
Moses (creation ex nihilo). The second opinion is that of the Platonic
philosophers who argue that it is absurd for something composed of form
and matter to come into existence out of nothing and to ascribe such power
66. The dismissal of Aristotelian science as conjecture was considered radical
even in the sixteenth century. See Francisco Sanchez, That Nothing is Known, ed.
E. Limbrick and D. F. S. Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
p. 172 n.19.
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to God is like believing that He can make 2 1 2 5 5. Instead, they argue for
creation out of a pre-existing matter. The third opinion is that of the
Aristotelians who believe that God and the universe are co-eternal. He
mentions the Epicureans who supposedly believed that there is no God and
that everything comes about by chance but sees no purpose in discussing
that opinion since the existence of God has been “demonstrated” which is
to say that it is a logical certainty. There is also no sense in arguing with the
Platonists because from the point of view of the Law of Moses it makes little
difference whether the universe is eternal or only the matter from which it
comes.67 He promises to show how creation ex nihilo is not only possible but
that to believe in it is an obligation.68 He also promises to explain Aristotle’s
“proofs” for the eternity of the universe.
Book II, Chapter 14
There is no point in refuting any of the philosophers besides Aristotle
regarding their disagreements with the “fundamental principles of the
Law.” Since Aristotle’s arguments are the most powerful, refuting him will
serve to refute the others as well. He mentions four arguments of Aristotle
(which, presumably, will be refuted later on):
(1) Aristotle argues that motion in the absolute sense is not subject to
creation or destruction because every motion is produced by some
other motion. Indeed, for Aristotle, time is dependent upon motion
and, therefore, time is not subject to creation or destruction either.
(2) Prime matter, which admits no form, is not subject to creation or
destruction. Since it has no form, it is not generated because to create
or generate something means to endow it with form.
(3) When a thing passes away it is due to something “contrary.” But the
circular motion of the heavenly bodies has no contrary and, therefore,
is not subject to destruction. That which is not subject to destruction is
not subject to creation either.
(4) With everything produced in time, its possibility precedes its crea-
tion. Imagine a time prior to the creation of the world. Either its
creation is necessary, possible, or impossible. If it is necessary, it can’t
lack existence and is eternal. If it is impossible, it cannot exist. If it is
possible, there must be a substrate (matter) for its possibility. Hence,
either the world is eternal or it does not exist at all. An intelligent
Mutakallimun responded to this argument by asserting that the prior
67. Belief in creation out of pre-existing matter is not completely foreign to
Jewish thought and does not falsify revelation as Aristotle’s view does. This seems to
be an argument from authority.
68. This is consistent with his method. First you show that the mandated belief
is not impossible, then you show that it is obligatory and finally you show that it is
rationally defensible.
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possibility resides in the creator and not in the object of creation.
Maimonides sees no difference between these states; to ascribe possi-
bility to the creator is equally problematic.
Maimonides mentions some arguments for eternity by later followers
of Aristotle. They resemble the previous arguments but in a more theistic
mode, ascribing  imperfection to  a deity who acts at  times  and  not  at
other times. Finally he mentions a different argument. Since all of the
nations believed in an eternal universe, that belief must be natural and
not conventional.69
Book II, Chapter 15
In this chapter, Maimonides proposed to show not only that Aristotle failed
to demonstrate his eternity thesis but never even thought that he had.
Aristotle attempts to corroborate his view by referring to the physicists of
the past, but arguments from authority do not mix well with demonstrative
arguments—who would have known this better than Aristotle? In a similar
vein, Aristotle insists on airing the opposing views prior to promulgating his
own and justified it by asserting that this will make his own views more
acceptable. But if a matter is demonstrated, as is true of mathematical/logi-
cal truths, it does not matter what other views precede it. Certainly, Aristotle
knew the difference between demonstrative arguments and rhetorical or
dialectical ones. Therefore, he could not have believed that the eternity of
the universe was demonstrated.
Book II, Chapter 16
This short chapter is one of the most difficult of the entire book as it seems
inconsistent with oft-repeated opinions of Maimonides and may be inter-
nally inconsistent as well. Yet it may hold the key to his method. Here
Maimonides promises to explain his own beliefs regarding creation; it is not
impossible, he asserts, and any argument to the contrary can be invalidated.
Creation versus eternity, he asserts, is an “open question.” If a proposition
cannot be demonstrated it is best to leave it unresolved rather than to
“prove” it by dialectical methods. Creation ex nihilo should, therefore, be
accepted solely on the basis of prophecy, which is even consistent with the
69. That argument seems to rest on an Aristotelian notion of an essential
human nature which somehow includes goodness and truth. But this should not be
surprising since Maimonides has already stated that only Aristotle’s arguments are
worth refuting.
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eternity thesis.70 But he promises that once he proves its possibility he will
“make it prevail” on the basis of a non-demonstrative argumentation.71 He
admits that a “certain disgrace” attaches to his view and to those who believe
in the eternity of the universe but the disgrace of the latter is greater.72
Book II, Chapter 17
Maimonides now explains why the eternity of the universe is such a plausi-
ble view but why it is hardly proven. A story is told of a boy shipwrecked
upon an island who grows up never having any experience with women
because his mother had died when he was a few months old. He asks a man
(perhaps his father) how people come into existence. He is told about
women and pregnancy, and so on. For him, with his limited knowledge of
human life, the idea of intrauterine life is fantastic and unbelievable. He
believes that he can disprove this theory of human origins based on the
nature of human life as he knows it. Similarly, Aristotle and his followers
cannot conceive of an absolute beginning of the universe, based upon the
world as they know it. This parable shows that one cannot argue about
origins based on the present state of affairs.
70. This seems contrary to what he asserted previously about the inconsistency
between revelation and eternity. Professor Toledano interprets it as meaning that
since Aristotle did not prove the eternity thesis, it cannot be used as a basis for
refuting prophecy. We could imagine a person who believes in two inconsistent
theories: the eternity thesis and prophecy and has no rational way of resolving the
conflict. Maimonides asserts that in such a case one should follow prophecy.
71. This seems inconsistent with his prior condemnation of dialectical argu-
ments but it can be explained. First one should accept a proposition as an axiom
based on authority always recognizing that it could be false and has not been
proved. If one finds no good reason to reject it, one can then attempt to prove it by
non-demonstrative means. But if one first attempts the proof and accepts it, as the
Kala˜m did, then no evidence to the contrary is likely to change one’s mind.
72. But the term “disgrace,” while correct literally, may not be the best trans-
lation of the Arabic term shana ‘at (ugliness, repulsiveness, hideousness, disgrace)
and what we may be dealing with here is degrees of incongruity. Kafih translates the
term into Hebrew as “difficulties, objections.” In other words, the argument for
creation involves one in undesirable consequences. Ibn Tibbon translates it there
as “absurdity.” In other places the same word is translated as “strangeness” by Kafih
and as “incongruity” by Pines. Perhaps Pines avoided that translation here because
it would create an additional problem. What Maimonides would then have been
saying is that the argument for creation is not only speculative but also incurs
difficulties, strange conclusions, or incongruities. This interpretation would lead to
the following conclusion. The question of creation versus eternity is not only an
“open question” in terms of deciding between the two but even after one decides,
it becomes obvious from the incongruities produced that one’s understanding of it
is essentially inadequate. This would most likely stem from the fifth cause of
inconsistencies.
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Book II, Chapter 18
In this chapter, Maimonides attempts to refute certain views about creation
which make it seem to be an impossibility. Could the deity pass from
potentiality to actuality by acting at a certain time? As an immaterial being
is never in potentiality, that argument is refuted. It was argued by some that
eternity is necessary because there are no incentives for God to act or
change. Maimonides considers this to be a subtle matter. The essence of a
being may remain the same but supervening accidents induce him or her
to act. Another argument is that God’s wisdom is eternal and unchanging
and whatever necessarily proceeds from it is likewise eternal. This is a feeble
argument because we are so ignorant of God’s wisdom and providence.
Finally, he discusses Aristotle’s remark that the nations all agreed that God
and the angels are in heaven. Maimonides agrees that the heavens supply
proof of the existence of God and the angelic intellects but no proof of the
eternity of the universe.
Book II, Chapter 19
This is the chapter that seems to have confused many commentators be-
cause Maimonides proposes to prove creation in a manner that comes
“close to being a demonstration.” He warns the reader that his proofs may
resemble those of the Mutakallimun (particularly regarding particulariza-
tion) but they will not really be the same at all. For the Kal˜am, particulari-
zation (takhsis) follows from the basic view of atomism and from the tenth
proposition, but Maimonides promises to show particularization from “the
nature of that which exists.” His argument is long and tedious; he quotes
Aristotle regarding the fallibility of this science and also remarks on certain
astronomical anomalies. The gist of the argument can be summarized in his
own words. “If the matter of the spheres is one and the same, in virtue of
what thing has any sphere been so particularized as to receive a nature
other than the nature of any other sphere? . . . There must of necessity be
something that particularizes.”73 We can see that this argument is different
from the Kal˜am argument. According to the Kala˜m, everything is composed
of atoms that lack properties, and the qualitative aspect of reality is a
constant free creation of God. But for Maimonides, that is not the case
regarding sub-lunar reality.74 He admits that this argument might be com-
73. Guide II, 19, pp. 311–12. An interesting part of this argument is that it
seems to rest on an Aristotelian world-view regarding a common material substrate
and assumes the need to explain unusual aspects of reality. But the fact that
something functions as an explanans does not guarantee its reality. Many explana-
tory devises are abstracta (unreal theoretical entities).
74. As Shlomo Pines points out in his excellent discussion of particularization
and the Kala˜m in his introduction to the Guide (pp. cxxiv–cxxxi), this is open to two
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patible with a theory of eternal creation and promises to discuss this more
fully.
Book II, Chapter 20
Here Maimonides attempts to use Aristotle’s own argument against chance
occurrence to buttress the argument for creation. Chance occurrences do
not ordinarily appear all the time or even in the majority of cases, but we
do find them in many natural occurrences. Therefore, spontaneity cannot
be invoked as an explanatory principle, according to Aristotle, who believed
that each thing has a cause that necessitates its existence and is connected
with its essence. But for Maimonides, one cannot logically combine a belief
in necessity with a belief in creation from purpose as they are “near to a
combination of two contraries.” In other words, they cannot both be true.75
Later philosophers, however, either thought that purpose and particulari-
zation can be combined with the eternity of the world or they misunder-
stood Aristotle to be referring to purposeful creation. Maimonides promises
to treat those thinkers more fully in the ensuing chapters.
Book II, Chapter 21
Here Maimonides attempts to show that those who attempted to combine
the Aristotelian concept of an eternal universe with a creator God are
mistaken. His arguments are basically the same as his argument against
necessity and eternity of the universe. He concludes as follows:
Accordingly the matter is reduced to this, and the discussion finally
leads us to an inquiry concerning the diversity existing in the heavens,
with regard to which it has been demonstrated that it must necessarily
have a cause. The inquiry concerns the question whether this cause is
the ground of this diversity, the latter having necessarily proceeded
from the existence of this cause, or whether this cause is the agent that
has brought about this diversity and has particularized it in the way in
which we, the followers of Moses our Master, believe. . . . Thereupon I
shall begin to explain to you, with the help of speculation and philo-
interpretations. According to one, the spheres are qualitatively the same and accord-
ing to the other (Averroes’s view), human reason is incapable of cognizing what dif-
ferentiates (particularizes) them. The latter view would seem to imply some
immanent principle of causality and differentiation which was denied by Avicenna
and al-Ghazali in keeping with the Moslem predisposition for transcendental expla-
nations. In the thought of al-Ghazali, for example, everything is particularized by
God, but for Avicenna it is the work of the First Intelligence that emanates from God.
75. Please note, however, that Maimonides does not claim that these positions
are contradictory. They cannot both be true but they can both be false.
246 ANDREW L. GLUCK
sophic proofs devoid of falsification, my preference in favor of the
opinion according to which the world has been produced in time.76
Book II, Chapter 22
Maimonides expresses doubts about certain aspects of Aristotelian science
and metaphysics. If only a simple thing can issue from a simple thing, how
do we ever get to complexity? He repeats some doubts previously expressed
regarding the movements of the heavenly bodies. He introduces doubts
about the applicability of the conventional form-matter dichotomy to the
heavenly bodies. All these perplexities can be resolved, he says, by reference
to a Creator.
Maimonides also says some interesting things here about science in
general. In keeping with the presuppositions of Aristotelian science he
admits that everything that Aristotle said about sub-lunar reality is not only
correct but “indubitably correct.” No one would oppose it unless they failed
to understand it. This is in keeping with the Aristotelian ideal of science as
necessary truth. But when it come to the heavens, Aristotle’s views are mere
“guessing and conjecturing.” Presumably, he might also have said the same
about the Ptolemaic astronomy of his own day.
He asks not to be criticized for introducing doubts about Aristotle and
admits that doubts can neither disprove a theory nor prove a contrary one.
He introduces a method that some have likened to probability or induction.
Alexander of Aphrodisias said that when demonstrative arguments are not
available, one should choose the opinion that engenders the least number
of doubts. Maimonides asserts that he has already used this method though
it was never explicitly stated.
We have acted in this way when it was to our mind established as true that,
regarding the question whether the heavens are generates or eternal,
neither of the two contrary opinions could be demonstrated. For we
have explained the doubts attaching to each of the opinions and have
shown to you that the opinion favoring the eternity of the world is the
one that raises more doubts and is more harmful for the belief that ought
to be held with regard to the deity. And this, in addition to the fact that
the world’s being produced in time is the opinion of Abraham our Father
and our prophet Moses, may peace be on both of them.77
76. Guide II, 21, pp. 315–16.
77. Guide II, 22, p. 320. It is not clear whether he refers to doubts about the
opinion in question or doubts about other religious dogmas. Please note the
reinterpretation of the term “doubt” to include not only what might ordinarily be
considered rational doubt but also to include doubts about religious dogma. In
other words, Alexander had been referring to doubts about an explanatory hy-
pothesis, not doubts engendered by religious dogma. But as we shall see, it is
precisely this latter type of argument that Maimonides really relies upon.
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Admittedly, there is some ambiguity here, but it certainly seems that this
method of doubt supplements another argument from authority, and he
clearly attempts to differentiate the two. Presumably, his method of doubt
works even for one who does not accept the authority of Abraham and
Moses. Maimonides now promises to pursue this method of comparing
doubts.
Book II, Chapter 23
In this chapter Maimonides appears to pursue an inductive approach to the
matter under discussion but it is really more of a normative one. He begins
by revising Alexander of Aphrodias’s method of appraising theories by
comparing doubts. It is not the number of doubts that is significant but “how
great is their incongruity and what is their disagreement with what exists.
Sometimes a single doubt is more powerful than a thousand other doubts”78
Now Maimonides introduces a condition which makes this method practi-
cally impossible to apply and he seems to contradict himself as well:
Furthermore this comparison can be correctly made only by someone
for whom the two contraries are equal. But whoever prefers one of the
two opinions because of his upbringing or for some advantage, is blind
to the truth. While one who entertains an unfounded predilection
cannot make himself oppose a matter susceptible to demonstration, in
matters like those under discussion such an opposition is often possi-
ble. Sometimes, if you wish it, you can rid yourself of an unfounded
predilection, free yourself of what is habitual, rely solely on speculation,
and prefer the opinion that you ought to prefer. However, to do this
you must fulfill several conditions. The first of them is that you should
know how good your mind is and that your inborn disposition is sound.
This becomes clear to you through training in all the mathematical
sciences and through grasp of the rules of logic. The second condition
is to have knowledge of the natural sciences and to apprehend their
truth so that you should know your doubts in their true reality. The
third condition concerns your morals. For whenever a man finds him-
self inclining—and to our mind it makes no difference if this happens
because of his natural disposition or because of an acquired charac-
teristic—toward lusts and pleasures or preferring anger and fury, giving
the upper hand to his irascible faculty and letting go its reins, he shall
be at fault and stumble wherever he goes. For he shall seek opinions
that will help him in that toward which his nature inclines. I have drawn
your attention to this in order that you should not be deceived. For
someone may some day lead you into vain imaginings through setting
forth a doubt concerning the creation of the world in time, and you
may be very quick to let yourself be deceived. For in this opinion is
78. Guide II, 23, p. 321.
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contained the destruction of the foundation of the Law and a presump-
tuous assertion with regard to the deity.79
It should be apparent that few, if any, religious believers can be truly
indifferent between an opinion which confirms their faith and one which
is inconsistent with it. Maimonides is concerned about people being led
astray by their moral weaknesses—and so he should as a moralist. But as a
philosopher, in consonance with what he has himself stated, he should also
be concerned about a person being led away from the truth by loyalty or
irrational attachment to religious dogma yet he does not seem so con-
cerned about the latter.80 In fact, he abandons the method of comparing
doubts altogether when he warns: “Do not turn away from the opinion
according to which the world is new, except because of a demonstration.”81
Maimonides now clearly recognizes that he has gone beyond a rational
critique of Aristotelian arguments and asks the reader not to criticize him
for engaging in rhetoric because Aristotle also engaged  in rhetoric  to
support his opinion. Quoting the Talmud, he argues:
In such cases it may truly be said: Shall not our perfect Torah be [worth as
much] as their frivolous talk? If he82 refers in support of his opinion to
the ravings of the Sabians, how can we but refer in support of our
opinion to the words of Moses and Abraham and to everything that
follows therefrom?83
Book II, Chapter 24
The point of this chapter is to reiterate that Aristotle’s astronomy is faulty
and not as good as Ptolemaic astronomy but his physics is “in accordance
with reasoning.” But this is not surprising since: “The heavens are the heavens
of the Lord, but the earth hath he given to the sons of man.”84 The end result:
skepticism regarding things far away which are alleviated by blind faith.
And to fatigue the minds with notions that cannot be grasped by them
and for the grasp of which they have no instrument, is a defect in one’s
inborn disposition or some sort of temptation. Let us then stop at a point
that is within our capacity, and let us give over the things that cannot be
grasped by reasoning to him who was reached by the mighty divine
79. Guide II, 24 and 23, p. 321.
80. It is problems like this that may have led Leo Strauss to assert that the Guide
is not a philosophical work at all but in the very Kala˜m tradition which Maimonides
purported to oppose. I am not completely in agreement with that position and in
fact in other contexts Maimonides admits that sacred texts can lead people away
from the truth. See Guide I, 31.
81. Guide II, 23, p. 322.
82. He refers to Aristotle here.
83. Guide II, 23, p. 322.
84. Psalm 115:16.
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overflow so that it could be fittingly said of him: With him do I speak mouth
to mouth. That is the end of what I have to say about this question.85
Book II, Chapter 25
It is in this chapter that Maimonides gives his real seasons for rejecting the
eternity of the world and for adhering to the doctrine of creation. It is not
because of the literal meaning of the Torah. Though the Bible is authorita-
tive, it can always be interpreted allegorically when it conflicts with reason
as when it refers to God as being corporeal. There are two reasons for his
decision. First, eternity has not been demonstrated, nor has creation been
disproved by demonstration. Second, unlike the belief in the incorporeality
of God, belief in eternity of the universe really undermines the Torah. This
is a subtle distinction. He admits that in the minds of the ignorant anything
that goes against its literal meaning undermines the Torah but the eternity
thesis undermines it in a more fundamental way. It undermines the very
possibility of revelation.
X. AN EXPANDED SCHEMATIZATION
OF MAIMONIDES’ ARGUMENT
We have seen that the basic argument, while logically valid, can be attacked
in terms of its premises. Hence, an expanded argument is needed such as
the following that would work equally well for either creation ex nihilo or a
Platonic creation out of pre-existing matter:
If revelation is a fact, God did something quite novel in the world;
this is consistent with creation but inconsistent with an eternal
universe where nothing essentially novel occurs.
Aside from creation and eternity there are no other tenable expla-
nations for the existence of the universe.
We, heretofore, have believed in revelation as a fact as well as its
teaching regarding creation.
The eternity of the universe has not been logically proved nor has
creation been disproved.
Therefore, we have no reason to revise our belief in revelation and
creation and the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the universe
is rejected.86
85. Guide II, 24, p. 327.
86. It should be noted that the “Aristotle” who was applauded or attacked by
medieval scholars was usually a Neoplatonized Aristotle as seen through the eyes of
Avicenna or al Farabi.
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This is a much more complex argument than the original one. It revolves
around Maimonides’ prescription to first accept creation on authority and
then try to prove/disprove it (if you cannot disprove a perfectly useful belief,
continue to believe it). Revelation as a fact no longer implies creation but is
merely consistent with it and inconsistent with eternity. Maimonides’ argu-
ment could be attacked because premises two and three seem arbitrary but
they give him additional options. He can argue that his support for creation
is not dependent upon a literal reading of the Torah because disregarding the
content altogether the mere fact of revelation implies creation as an explana-
tion (as long as there are no other tenable alternatives). And if there turns
out to be a tenable alternative, he could fall back upon the content of
revelation which, indeed, teaches that God created the universe.87 The argu-
ment is in the mode of conjecturing solutions to problems where the answers
cannot  be logically demonstrated and  then testing their logical conse-
quences. As long as the logical consequences of a useful theory are not shown
to be false, the theory stands; how one arrived at it is irrelevant. The belief in
revelation has been a useful one and it entails rejection of Aristotle’s eternity
thesis. We have no other compelling reason to accept the Aristotelian thesis
and there are no other viable options, so we retain our belief in creation.
What is the status of this argument? It does not disprove the eternity
thesis. Even if we could disprove eternity, it does not prove that revelation
(or creation) is a fact but rests on the fact of revelation. That is not to say
that if revelation were disproved creation would be impossible but the
argument is only logically valid if one accepts revelation. What he is saying
in the Guide can be paraphrased as follows. I give many persuasive but
non-demonstrative arguments in favor of creation and opposed to eternity.
But if one believes in revelation one is obliged by logic to reject eternity and
believe in creation unless creation demonstrated to be false.
XI. CONSONANCE WITH MAIMONIDES’
OTHER WRITINGS
We discussed Maimonides’ concept of “foundation of the Torah.” Although
it refers to an important ingredient, it is not a dogma that is essential to the
practice of Judaism.88
87. Can one really differentiate between the content of revelation and the fact
of revelation? Perhaps to the believer revelation is utterly unique and can’t be
included in any general conceptual scheme. This was noted by Karl Jaspers in
Philosophical Faith and Revelation (New York: Harper Row, 1967). That seems to be a
psychological tendency and explains the intolerance of religions based on a claimed
revelation. Each one insists on only one authoritative revelation.
88. The Arabic word is qawa˜ ‘id al sharò ‘a, which Kafih translates into Hebrew
as yesodot ha torah. According to Professor Toledano it means “groundworks,
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Belief in creation was not among Maimonides’ original thirteen essen-
tial principles or dogmas of Judaism listed in the commentary on Helek. Late
in his life, after he wrote the Guide, he does seem to have included creation
as a part of the fourth principle.89 Many explanations have been adduced
for this but there is one which is consistent with our interpretation. With
any theory or model one must distinguish between beliefs which constitute
the essential body of that model and those which are logical inferences.
One must believe the former in order to truly accept the model but the
latter must only be accepted once their logical inference from the theory
has been established. Prior to the groundbreaking work of Maimonides,
creation and eternity were irrelevant to the essence of Judaism since Gene-
sis can be interpreted allegorically. But once it was established that belief in
eternity destroys the Law things change radically. Convinced that his argu-
ment for creation in the Guide was logically valid and seeing the danger of
the eternity thesis, Maimonides took it upon himself to redefine Judaism.90
This may not be the only time that he did so but in this case he seems to
have redefined his own initial definition.91
XII. SUMMARY
Maimonides gives three types of arguments for creation and against eternity
of the universe:
(A) Arguments from authority
(B) Quasi-empirical argument
(C) Argument from consistency of belief
The argument from authority becomes superfluous once the effective argu-
ment is understood. The quasi-empirical arguments are inconsistent with
his views and inconclusive at best. All that remains is an argument from
foundations, fundaments, bases.” In referring to the fundamentals of the Torah
Maimonides uses either the terms qaw˜a ‘id (singular qa ‘ida) or asl. They refer to a
broad range of fundamental beliefs and are not restricted to the thirteen principles
or dogmas enunciated in Perek Helek.
89. The manuscript is to be found in Oxford University Library (MS Pococke
295; Neubauer no. 301). Its authenticity has been disputed, but it was published by
Solomon Sassoon in his Maimonides Commentarius in Mischam (Copenhagen: Ejnar
Munksgaan 1961), ii, plate 301. Its authenticity was attested to by Rabbi Sassoon,
Rabbi Kafih, and Shlomo Pines. Isaac Sassoon, the son of Solomon Sassoon, in a
recent conversation stated that he is still convinced of its authenticity.
90. I am not referring to the Guide but to the just cited revision of his thirteen
principles.
91. For an excellent discussion see Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought.
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consistency of belief. Eternity, inconsistent with the concept of revelation,
is therefore rejected. While eternity is rejected and creation accepted, the
kind of creation accepted is an esoteric one which has little to do with the
literal  meaning of the Biblical  text. The argument is rational  but the
premises are neither self-evident nor rationally justified.
XIII. CONCLUSION
What I have described as Maimonides’ argument may seem an unusual
explanation of the writings of a twelfth-century dogmatist.92 My assump-
tions are that he was well acquainted and enamored with logic, held
strongly to most traditional beliefs, but had esoteric views as well.
There is something disturbing about the argument. It proceeds from be-
lief to belief, not from facts to belief, and it appears subjective. If revelation
were a generally agreed upon belief (as in the Middle Ages) and no alterna-
tives to creation and eternity were plausible, then his argument would indeed
come close to being demonstrative. Revelation, however, is no longer con-
ventional wisdom but the object of specific religious faiths and his argument
may not mean much to those who do not already believe in it. The argument,
however, can be shared by a number of religious communities and Mai-
monides acknowledged that belief in creation was shared by Judaism, Christi-
anity, and Islam despite their differences on many other issues.93
Maimonides  argued against essential knowledge of God. Likewise,
modern science, which reveals much about matter, leaves us perplexed
regarding its essential nature. As we become less certain regarding the
nature of physical reality, conflict between science and religion moves to the
human reality. As Thomas Aquinas states: “For errors about creatures some-
times lead one astray from the truth of faith, so far as the errors are
inconsistent with true knowledge of God.”94 Materialism in regard to hu-
man nature, for example, conflicts with religion and leads to moral relativ-
ism. Like the eternity thesis, it “destroys the Law in its principle, necessarily
92. This is not meant in a pejorative sense but as a description of a person who
pioneered the formulation of dogma in Judaism. See Kellner, Dogma in Medieval
Jewish Thought.
93. The kind of creator, like the kind of creation that is believed in by the three
monotheistic faiths, requires a belief in revelation. Unlike some creation myths, the
Biblical God is the Lord of nature and creator of matter who cares about human-
kind and expresses that caring by an act of revelation. As Burrell states: “Affirming
creation required faith in a revelation, and revelation presupposed one revealing.”
See D. B. Burrell, Aquinas’ Debt to Maimonides, A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval
Philosophy and Culture: Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, ed. Ruth Link-Salinger
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), p. 41.
94. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book Two: Creation, trans. J. F.
Anderson (Notre Dame: Ind. Notre Dame Press, 1975), p. 32.
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gives lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all the hopes and threats
that the Law has held out.”
It is a mistake to think that deep metaphysical questions like creation
versus eternity are irrelevant to practical human life and Maimonides was
very much aware of that. The notion that humankind was created in the
image of God, for example, must have had a tremendous impact upon the
self-image of the Western peoples. Inevitably, however, thinking people
want to understand what is meant by “image” and “create.” A modern
reconstruction of Maimonides’ argument might assert that revelation and
its attendant creation doctrine is essential to the perfecting of the human
virtues (including intellectual virtue).95 That assertion, if it is to be a signifi-
cant one, however, would imply a prior concept of human nature and
virtue.96 “The Torah speaks in the language of man,” and knowledge of
human nature distinguishes the universal language of man from the histori-
cal language of particular men.97 Our view of humanity has changed from
Biblical times but two things have remained constant. We believe in free will
in our practical reasoning and as Adam was given the power to name all
creatures (Genesis 2:18), we also name and conceptualize all things.98 But
knowledge of those “things” may never be true knowledge as long as man
remains a mystery to himself.
95. In the Guide III, 54, Maimonides lists four human perfections. The first two
(possessions and bodily perfection) do not require it. The other two (moral and intel-
lectual virtue) do. Without creation/revelation, free will and moral virtue are impos-
sible. Without moral virtue, intellectual virtue is impossible. For a good discussion see
A. Altmann, “Maimonides’ Four Perfections,” in A. Altmann, Essays in Jewish Intellec-
tual History (Hanover, N.H: Brandeis University Press, 1981), pp. 65–76.
96. Otherwise, revelation simply defines human virtue and the claim is tauto-
logical.
97. Man is created by God with a nature but the only way to fully appreciate it
is through revelation. Conversely, any attempt to understand revelation without
some knowledge of the human essence is doomed to failure. Religion and philoso-
phy each supply something unique. The Aristotelian nature/virtue and the Biblical
commandments reinforce one another.
98. Maimonides interprets Adam’s power to name creatures as meaning that
language is conventional and not natural (Guide II, 30). That debate regarding the
nature of language goes on. But if revelation is to be everlastingly true, it must be
addressed to the very essence of humanity, and freedom constitutes a part of that
essence. David Burrell describes human freedom following “as a perfection utterly
consonant with the existential order of a universe conceived as the gift of a free
creator.” See D. Burrell, “Creation and ‘Actualism’,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology
4 (1994): 33. Maimonides may not have held such an expansive view of human
freedom but there is no reason why his argument could not lead to something that
he himself could not have envisaged. The rejection of idolatry may also be a
necessary precondition for an adequate conception of human nature/virtue. For
Maimonides, the purpose of the Mosaic Law is the destruction of idolatry. Leo
Strauss opined that the rejection of idolatry does not really follow strictly from
monotheism and divine incorporeality but only from the doctrine of creation ex
nihilo. See his introductory essay to the Guide, pp. xxii–xxiii.
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